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Abstract
We consider processes on social networks that can potentially involve
three factors: homophily, or the formation of social ties due to matching
individual traits; social contagion, also known as social influence; and the
causal effect of an individual’s covariates on their behavior or other mea-
surable responses. We show that, generically, all of these are confounded
with each other. Distinguishing them from one another requires strong as-
sumptions on the parametrization of the social process or on the adequacy
of the covariates used (or both). In particular we demonstrate, with sim-
ple examples, that asymmetries in regression coefficients cannot identify
causal effects, and that very simple models of imitation (a form of social
contagion) can produce substantial correlations between an individual’s
enduring traits and their choices, even when there is no intrinsic affinity
between them. We also suggest some possible constructive responses to
these results.
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1 Introduction: “If your friend jumped off a
bridge, would you jump too?”
We all know that people who are close to each other in a social network are
similar in many ways: they share characteristics, act in similar ways, and similar
events are known to befall them. Do they act similarly because they are close in
the network, due to some form of influence that acts along network ties (or, as it
is often suggestively put, “contagion”1)? Or rather are they close in the network
because of these similarities, through the processes known assortative mixing on
traits, or more simply as homophily (McPherson et al., 2001)? Suppose that
there are two friends named Ian and Joey, and Ian’s parents ask him the classic
hypothetical of social influence: “If your friend Joey jumped off a bridge, would
you jump too?” Why might Ian answer “yes”?
1. Because Joey’s example inspired Ian (social contagion/influence);
2. Because Joey infected Ian with a parasite which suppresses fear of falling
(biological contagion);
3. Because Joey and Ian are friends on account of their shared fondness for
jumping off bridges (manifest homophily, on the characteristic of interest);
4. Because Joey and Ian became friends through a thrill-seeking club, whose
membership rolls are publicly available (secondary homophily, on a differ-
ent yet observed characteristic);
5. Because Joey and Ian became friends through their shared fondness for
roller-coasters, which was caused by their common thrill-seeking propen-
sity, which also leads them to jump off bridges (latent homophily, on an
unobserved characteristic);
1Analogies between the spread of ideas and behaviors — especially disliked ideas and
behaviors — and the spread of disease are ancient. Pliny the Younger, for instance, referred
to Christianity as a “contagious superstition” in a letter to the Emperor Trajan in 110 (Epistles
X 96). Siegfried (1960/1965) gives further examples. The best treatment of this analogy is
made by Sperber (1996).
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6. Because Joey and Ian both happen to be on the Tacoma Narrows Bridge
in November, 1940, and jumping is safer than staying on a bridge that is
tearing itself apart (common external causation).
The distinctions between these mechanisms — and others which no doubt
occur to the reader — are all ones which make causal differences. In particular,
if there is any sort of contagion, then measures which specifically prevent Joey
from jumping off the bridge (such as restraining him) will also have the effect
of tending to keep Ian from doing so; this is not the case if contagion is absent.
However, the crucial question is whether these distinctions make differences in
the purely observational setting, since we are usually not able to conduct an
experiment in which we push Joey off the bridge and see whether Ian jumps (let
alone repeated trials.)
The goal of this paper is to establish that these are, by and large, phenom-
ena that are surprisingly difficult to distinguish in purely observational studies.
More precisely, latent homophily and contagion are generically confounded with
each other (section 2), and any direct contagion effects cannot be nonparametri-
cally identified from observational data2. To identify contagion effects, we need
either strong parametric assumptions or strong substantive knowledge that lets
us rule out latent homophily as a causal factor. It has been proposed that
asymmetries in regression estimates which match asymmetries in the social net-
work would let us establish direct social contagion; we show (Section 2.2) as a
corollary of our main result that this also fails.
We realize that many issues with unobservable characteristics exist in many
observational study settings, not just in those that share our explicit focus on
network phenomena, yet our investigations of social contagion are not driven by
some animus; we are just as concerned for those investigations that ignore net-
work structure when it is present. If contagion works along with homophily, we
show that it confounds inferences for relationships between homophilous traits
and outcome variables such as observed behaviors (Section 3). In particular,
even when the true causal effect of the homophilous trait is zero, the trait can
still act as a strong predictor of the outcome of interest merely through the
outcome’s natural diffusion in a network (Section 3.1).
We also realize that our main findings are negative, and implicitly critical of
much previous work. Section 4 suggests some possible constructive responses to
our findings, while Section 5 concludes with some methodological reflections.
2We remind the reader of the relevant sense of “identification” (Manski, 2007). We have
a collection of random variables, which are generated by one causal process M out of a set
of possible processes M. Not all aspects of this process are recorded, and the result is a
distribution P over observables. Each M leads to only one distribution over observables,
P (M). A functional θ of the data-generating process is identifiable if it depends on M only
through P (M), i.e., if θ(M) 6= θ(M ′) implies P (M) 6= P (M ′). Otherwise, the functional
is unidentifiable. If θ is identifiable only when M is restricted to a finitely parameterized
family, then θ is parametrically identifiable (within that family). If θ is identifiable without
such a restriction, it is non-parametrically identifiable. See further Pearl (2009b, ch. 3) on
identification of causal effects from observables.
3
1.1 Notation, Terminology, Conventions
In our framework the random variable Xi is a collection of unchanging latent
traits for node i; similarly, Zi is a collection of static observed traits. Both X
and Z may be discrete, continuous, mixtures of both, etc. The social network
is represented by the binary variable Aij , which is 1 if there is a (directed) edge
from i to j — that is, i considers j to be a “friend” — and 0 otherwise. Time
t advances in discrete steps of equal duration; this is inessential but avoids
mathematical complications. Yi(t) denotes a response variable for node i at
time t; again, whether categorical, metric or otherwise doesn’t matter. (We will
sometimes write this as Y (i, t) or even Yit, as typographically convenient, and
likewise for other indices.) These variables are also listed in Figure 2, alongside
a graphical representation of the prototypical process we are examining.
We conducted all simulations in R (R Development Core Team, 2008). Our
code is available from http://www.stat.cmu.edu/~cshalizi/homophily-confounding/.
2 How Homophily and Individual-Level Causa-
tion Look Like Contagion
The members of a social network often exhibit correlated behavior. When we
speak of contagion or influence within networks, we imply that conditioning on
all other factors, there will be a temporal relationship between the behaviour of
individual i at time t and any neighbours of i (potential j’s) at the previous time
point. This is easiest to see when all other causes of adoption of a trait aside from
the network itself are eliminated, such as person-to-person infectious diseases
(Bartlett, 1960; Ellner and Guckenheimer, 2006; Newman, 2002), though other
examples include the spread of innovations (Rogers, 2003).
More puzzling are situations such as the investigation of Christakis and
Fowler (2007), where the behavior that apparently spreads through the net-
work is “becoming obese”, as obesity is not normally thought of as an infectious
condition3, or the apparent spread of “happiness”, documented by Fowler and
Christakis (2008). It is natural to ask how much of such “network autocorre-
lation” — the tendency of these behaviors to be correlated in individuals that
are closely connected — is due to some direct influence of i’s neighbors on i’s
behavior, as opposed to the effect of homophily, in which social ties form be-
tween individuals with similar antecedent characteristics, who may then behave
similarly as a result4.
Social network scholars have long been concerned with this issue, under the
label of “selection versus influence” or “homophily versus contagion” (Leenders,
3There are however claims in the medical literature (Atkinson, 2007) that certain viruses
induce obesity in rodents and may contribute to the condition in human beings. (Thanks to
Matthew Berryman and Gustavo Lacerda for bringing this to our attention.) We lack the
knowledge to assess the soundness of these claims, let alone their plausibility as explanations
of human obesity.
4Sperber (1996, ch. 5) is a detailed and subtle exploration of just how powerful the latter
mechanism can be, and how it can interact with imitation or contagion.
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1995), usually with regard to manifest homophily but certainly not limited to
it. To give just one example of a sophisticated recent attempt to divide the
credit for network autocorrelation between homophily and contagion, consider
Aral et al. (2009). (The following remarks apply, with suitable changes, to
many other high-quality studies, e.g., Bakshy et al. (2009); Anagnostopoulos
et al. (2008); Yang et al. (2007); Bramoulle´ et al. (2009).) They worked with
a uniquely obtained data set with a clear outcome measure: the adoption of
an online service over time, with users of an instant messaging service as the
(extremely large) community of interest. To separate the effects of contagion
from those of homophily, a large and rich table of covariates on an individ-
ual’s personal and network characteristics was assembled (with 46 covariates
in total), and matched pairs were assembled using propensity score estimation
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) so that one member of the pair had, at one
point, exposure to the online service through one (or more) of their network
neighbors; assuming that these characteristic differences had then been teased
out, the difference in the adoption rate would then reflect the total proportion of
the adoption by contagion, allowing for an estimate of the proportion of associ-
ation that is attributable to contagion, as opposed to the proportions caused by
homophily, either secondary (in terms of the 46 observed network characteris-
tics) or manifest (caused by two users becoming friends specifically due to their
connection on the online service) – but notably, not latent homophily, which
may still remain as a component of the so-called “contagious” proportion; this
is due to the nature of propensity score matching, which can simplify the re-
lationships between observed properties and the adoption of a “treatment” (in
this case, network-localized exposure to the service), the effort may prove to be
inadequate if any unobserved covariates have a part in both tie selection and in
service adoption.
This brings us to our fundamental point: to attempt to assign strengths to
influence or contagion as opposed to homophily presupposes that the distinc-
tion is identifiable, and there have been grounds to doubt this for some time.
Manski (1993), in a well-known paper, considered the related problem of the
identification of group effects: supposing that an individual’s behavior depends
on some individual-level predictors and on the mean behavior of the group to
which they belong, can the degree of dependence on the group be identified? He
showed that in general the answer is “no”, unless you make strong parametric
assumptions, and perhaps not even then (since group effects can fail to be iden-
tified even in linear models). Indeed, this has been shown to cause difficulties
in other social situation where this sort of phantom influence can be observed:
among others, Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2009) note that estimating the
apparent effect of parental influence on their child’s educational outcomes is
confounded by the actions of the larger community. (See Blume et al. 2010 for
a recent review of the group-effects literature.) However, this does not quite
answer our questions, since Manski considered influence from the group aver-
age, rather than from individual members of the network neighborhood, and
one could hope this would provide enough extra information for identification.
We now show that, in fact, contagion effects are nonparametrically uniden-
5
tifiable in the presence of latent homophily — that there is just no way to
separate selection from influence observationally. Our proof involves some sim-
ple manipulations of graphical causal models; we refer the reader to standard
references (Spirtes et al., 2001; Pearl, 2009b,a; Morgan and Winship, 2007) for
the necessary background.
2.1 Contagion Effects are Nonparametrically Unidentifi-
able
We first assume that there is latent homophily present in the system: the net-
work tie Aij is influenced by the unobserved traits of each individual, Xi and
Xj . We assume that the “past” observable outcome Yi(t− 1) has a direct influ-
ence on the same outcome measured in the present, Yi(t).
5 We also assume that
Xi directly influences Yi(t) for all t, though possibly not to the same magnitude
or mechanism at each time t.6 Finally, we assume that another individual’s
prior outcome Yj(t − 1) can directly influence Yi(t) only if Aij = 1 — that is,
there must be an edge present for this direct influence to occur. We are in-
different as to whether the observable covariates Zi have a direct influence on
Yi(·), or whether it is correlated with the latent covariates Xi. The upshot of
these assumptions is the causal graph in Figure 1, examination of which should
make it unsurprising that contagion, the direct influence of Yj(t − 1) on Yi(t),
is confounded with latent homophily:
• Yj(t− 1) is informative about Xj ;
• Xj is informative about Xi when i and j are linked (Aij = 1); and
• Xi is informative about Yi(t).
Thus Yi(t) depends statistically on Yj(t − 1), whether or not there is a direct
causal effect of contagion present.
While this argument would appear to be loosely assembled, it can be tight-
ened up using the familiar rules for manipulating graphical causal models (Spirtes
et al., 2001; Pearl, 2009b). Xi d-separates Yi(t) from Aij . Since Xi is latent
and unobserved, Yi(t) ← Xi → Aij is a confounding path from Yi(t) to Aij .
Likewise Yj(t − 1) ← Xj → Aij is a confounding path from Yj(t − 1) to Aij .
Thus, Yi(t) and Yj(t−1) are d-connected when conditioning on all the observed
(boxed) variables in Figure 1. Hence the direct effect of Yj(t− 1) on Yi(t) is not
identifiable (Pearl, 2009b, §3.5, pp. 93–94).
This argument is not affected by adding conditioning on Yi(t − 1) or Yj(t),
as that does not remove the confounding paths. Nor does adding conditioning
on Zi, Zj remove the confounding. Nor is the situation helped by allowing Aij ,
5The results of this investigation hold even if this assumption is dropped, or if the time
dependence goes beyond the first order; that is, Yi(t − k) continues to influence Yi(t) even
after controlling for Yi(t− 1).
6The result will go through so long as Yi(t0) is influenced by Xi for at least one t0, and
for the subsequent observation t ≥ t0.
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X(i)
A(i,j)Y(i,t-1)
Y(i,t)
X(j)
Y(j,t-1)
Y(j,t)
Z(j)Z(i)
Figure 1: Causal graph allowing for
latent variables (X) to influence both
manifest network ties Aij and manifest
behaviors (Y ).
Symbol Meaning
i, j Individuals
Z Observed Traits
X Latent Traits
Y Observed Outcomes
Figure 2: Notational guide to
terms used in this investigation.
or indeed X, to vary over time, as is readily verified by drawing the appropriate
graphs. Finally, adding a third individual to the graph would not help: even if
they were, say, assumed to be linked to i but not j or vice versa, Yi(t)← Xi →
Aij and Yj(t− 1)← Xj → Aij would remain confounding paths.
How then might we get identifiability? It may be that very stringent para-
metric assumptions would suffice, though we have not been able to come up
with any which would be suffice7 Otherwise, we must keep X from being la-
tent, or, more precisely, either the components of X that influence Y must be
made observable (Figure 3a), or those parts of X which influence the social tie
formation A (Figure 3b). In either case the confounding arcs go away, and the
direct effect of Yj(t − 1) on Yi(t) becomes identifiable.8 It is noteworthy that
the most successful attempts at explicit modeling that handle both homophily
and influence, as found in the work of Leenders (1995); Steglich et al. (2004)
involves, all at once, strong parametric (exponential-family) assumptions, plus
the assumption that observable covariates carry all of the dependence from X
to Y and A; the latter is also implicitly assumed by the matching methods of
Aral et al. (2009).
Whether we face the unidentifiable situation of Figure 1, or the identifiable
case of Figure 3, currently depends upon subject-matter knowledge rather than
statistical techniques. It may be possible to adapt algorithms, such as those in
7In particular, making all of the relations between continuous variables in Figure 1 linear,
with independent noise for each variable, is not enough — the confounding path continues to
prevent identifiability even in a linear model.
8Elwert and Christakis (2008) is another interesting approach. In effect, they introduce
a third node, call it k, where they can assume that Yi is not influenced by Yk, but the
homophily is the same. Estimating the apparent influence of Yk on Yi then shows the extent
of confounding to due purely to homophily; if Yi is more dependent than this on Yj , the excess
is presumably due to actual causal influence.
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aX(i)
A(i,j)Z(i)
Y(i,t)
X(j)
Z(j)
Y(i,t-1) Y(j,t-1)
Y(j,t)
b
Z(i)
A(i,j)
Y(i,t)
Z(j)
Y(i,t-1)
X(i) X(j)
Y(j,t-1)
Y(j,t)
Figure 3: Modifications of the causal graph shown in Figure 1, in which observ-
able covariates (Z) conveys enough information about X that contagion effects
are unconfounded with latent homophily. In a (left), Z carries all of the causal
effect from X to the observable outcome Y ; in b (right), Z carries all of the
effect from X to the social network tie A.
Spirtes et al. (2001), to detect the presence of influential latent variables. Some
new methodological work would be required, however, since all such algorithms
known to us rely strongly on having a supply of independent cases, and social
networks are of interest precisely because individuals, and even dyads, are not
independent.
2.2 The Argument from Asymmetry
A clever argument for the presence of direct influence was introduced by Chris-
takis and Fowler (2007). By focusing on unreciprocated directed edges — pairs
(i, j) where Aij = 1 but Aji = 0, so that j’s prior outcome can be said to influ-
ence i’s present, but not i’s prior outcome on j’s present — one can consider the
distributions of the outcomes conditional on their partner’s previous outcome,
Yi(t)|Yj(t − 1) and Yj(t)|Yi(t − 1) (though other observable covariates (Zi, Zj)
may also be conditioned on.) An asymmetry here, revealed by the difference in
the corresponding regression coefficients, might then be due to some influence
being transmitted along the asymmetric edge, and not due to external common
causes (such as a new fast food restaurant) or other behaviours attributable to
latent characteristics.
This idea has considerable plausibility and has been picked up by a number of
other authors (Anagnostopoulos et al., 2008; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009), who have
shown that it works as a test for direct influence in some models. However, we
show that the argument can break down if two conditions are met: first, the
influencers (the j in the pair) differ systematically in their values of X from
the influenced (the i), and, second, different neighborhoods of X have different
local (linear) relationships to Y . As previously mentioned, the most successful
claims of simultaneous accounting of these phenomena require strong parametric
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assumptions, and our demonstration shows that even assumptions of linearity
may be too strong for this sort of data.
To illustrate this claim, we present a toy model of a network with latent
homophily on an X variable that controls an observable time series Y at multiple
points, but with no direct influence between values of Y for different nodes. We
present this as a multi-step time series to approximate the scenario of Christakis
and Fowler (2007), so that we can add the two most recent time steps of the
alter’s expression into the regression.9 We also note that there is no “coupled
evolution” of two nodes’ outcomes due to an exogenous common cause, one of
the stated purposes of the asymmetry test. Despite the lack of direct interaction,
it is possible to predict Yi at time t from the value of Y at its neighbors for
times t− 1 and t− 2, and these relations are asymmetric across unreciprocated
edges.
First we present the formation of the network, which contains n individuals
(nodes), and each node i has a scalar latent attribute Xi ∼ U(0, 1), which
are generated independently. We generate an underlying undirected network
(a potential friendship pool) where such an edge forms between i and j with
probability equal to logit−1(−3|Xi − Xj |), so that edges are more likely to
form between individuals with similar values of X. Each individual i then
nominates their “declared” friendships from these neighbors, naming j with
probability proportional to ∝ logit−1(−|Xj−0.5|) — individuals, whatever their
own value of X, prefer to nominate acquaintances closer to the median value
of that trait.10 For this demonstration, as in the data sets used in Christakis
and Fowler (2007); Fowler and Christakis (2008), each individual i declares
one friend, though the results hold for greater numbers of nominations. This
produces the sociomatrix/adjacency matrix A, where Aij = 1 signifies that
individual i has nominated j as a “friend”.
Second, we establish the time trends of the observable outcomes (Yi(t =
0), Yi(t = 1)):
• At time t = 0, we set Yi(0) = (Xi − 0.5)3 + N (0, (0.02)2), a nonlinear
assignment of outcome attributes.
• For time t = 1, we set Yi(1) = Yi(0) + 0.4Xi + N (0, (0.02)2), so that
the trend is greater for those individuals with higher values of the latent
attribute.
9The method in Christakis and Fowler (2007) uses a “simultaneous” regression set-up,
including Yj(t) as a predictor of Yi(t) as well as a previous time point Yj(t − 1). Treated at
face value, this can produce an incoherent probability distribution for the evolution of the
system (Lyons, 2010), as well as implying a scarcely-comprehensible notion of simultaneous
causation (rather than coupled behavior or feedback); this can be somewhat salvaged by
considering it as an observation that shares information from the “t minus one-half” time
point, as well as picking up any coupled behaviour at time t.
10Whether this is an actual bias in the social network formation process, or merely a part
of the process recording the network, does not matter. Also, results would work equally well
if ties were biased towards extreme rather than central values of X, for multivariate latent
traits, and so forth.
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X(i)
A(i,j) A(j,i) Y(i,t-2)
Y(i,t-1)
Y(i,t)
X(j)
Y(j,t-2)
Y(j,t-1)
Y(j,t)
Figure 4: Graphical causal model for our simulation study in section 2.2. Here,
unlike Figure 1, there are no arrows from (Yj(t − 2), Yj(t − 1)) to Yi(t) — the
former outcomes for the “alter” are not, in reality, a cause of the latter for the
“ego”, and the relationships of the Yj and Yi time series are symmetrical. As
we show in the text, however, not only Yi(t) predictable from Yj(t − 1), but
the relationship is asymmetric when social network ties are unreciprocated, i.e.,
Aij = 1 but Aji = 0.
• For time t = 2, we set Yi(2) = Yi(1)+0.4Xi+N (0, (0.02)2), repeating the
trend.
Figure 4 is the graphical model for the actual causal structure of our simu-
lation at three time points.
We simulate a network of fixed size (n = 400) from this model and estimated
the linear model
Yi(2) = α+ β1Yi(1) + β2
∑
j
AijYj(1) + β3
∑
j
AjiYj(1) +
β4
∑
j
AijYj(0) + β5
∑
j
AjiYj(0) + i ,
so that α represents the intercept term and β1 represents the autocorrelation;
β2 is the effect of the nominee’s status at time t = 1 on the nominator, and β3 is
the converse, the network effect if i was nominated by j, at time t = 1; β4 and β5
are those same coefficients for the outcome at time t = 0. This was replicated
5000 times, with the latent variables, time series and network regenerated in
each replication.
Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations. Figure 5a shows the mag-
nitude of β2, the coefficient of network influence; in 4010 of these 5000 trials is
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Figure 5: Results for a toy model where a latent variable causes spurious time-
dependent network effects. Clockwise from the top left: a) The estimate for β2,
the effect in the expected direction of influence. b) The estimate for β3, the ef-
fect in the opposite direction of influence (from the namer to the named). c) The
sum of the estimated effects, indicating that the effect for a mutual tie (in which
each respondent names the other) is greater than either the expected or oppo-
site unreciprocated tie effect. d) The normalized difference between directional
effects is clearly greater than zero on balance (in roughly 77% of simulations),
suggesting that the asymmetry in coefficient estimates can be produced without
contagion and falsely detected by t-tests on the difference.
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the estimate less than zero despite the lack of a direct connection, in line with
the empirical results of Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008). This is also the case
for Figure 5b, showing the apparent coefficient of a “reverse” network effect β3,
which is smaller in magnitude. Figure 5c shows the sum of the two effects; this
demonstrates that the effect of a mutual tie, where AijAji = 1, is determined
by the sum of the one-way effects and is greater than the effect of a “named”
tie, Aij = 1, which is greater than the effect of a “naming” tie, Aji = 1. This
is the result of the type that was cited in Christakis and Fowler (2007); Fowler
and Christakis (2008) but produced without any network interaction.11
Figure 5d shows the difference between the “sender” and “receiver” coeffi-
cients, which would be approximately Gaussian (for a t-distribution with 400
degrees of freedom) and centered at zero, if this were the case, a t-test could be
used to claim statistical significance in the difference between the two effects. It
is evident from the histogram that this null distribution is not centered at zero,
and about 77% of the sample values are positive, even though there is really no
effect. Thus, latent homophilous variables can produce a substantial apparent
contagion effect, including the asymmetry expected of actual contagion.
The parameter values in this model were not chosen to maximize either
the apparent contagion effect or its asymmetry, merely to demonstrate their
presence. As well, we note that controlling for additional past values of the
property for each node reduces the imbalance in magnitude, while it still remains
statistically significant; as we show in Section 4.2, this is not the end of the story
if we cannot find a bound for this asymmetry.
Additionally, it may seem unlikely that these conditions may exist on unob-
served variables in the system, but this still places the burden on the investigator
to pursue as many possible latent factors as may be present — an extremely
onerous task in a multi-decade observational study — or to work exclusively
with experimental data, such as in the recent work of Fowler and Christakis
(2010).
3 How Contagion and Homophily Look Like Cau-
sation At The Individual Level
We would be remiss if we gave the impression that it is only investigators who
actually take network structure into account who have problems. In this section,
we show that a very common kind of use of survey data, namely that relating
individual’s choices (cultural, political, economic, etc.) to their long-term stable
traits, is also confounded in the presence of homophily and contagion. Continu-
ing the spirit of Section 2.2, we present another toy model in which regressions
of choices on traits produce significant non-zero coefficients that are solely due
11There is also the notion of a “bonus” effect for mutual ties, β4
∑
j AijAjiYj(0), which
could provide an additional bump for mutuality that would indicate a stronger tie than simply
indicated by a binary specification. We leave this for another investigation, noting that the
mutual > named > namer relation is satisfied without adding this term.
12
X(i)
A(i,j)Y(i,t-1)
Y(i,t)
X(j)
Y(j,t-1)
Y(j,t)
Figure 6: Typical situation in surveys linking cultural choices to social traits
when homophily and influence exist.
to this confounding.12
It should be emphasized that there is a long tradition within social science
of distinguishing long-term, hard-to-change aspects of social organization and
individuals’ place in it, from more short-term, malleable aspects which show up
in behavior and choices. As Ernest Gellner (1973) put it, “Social structure is who
you can marry, culture is what you wear at the wedding.” The long-standing
theoretical presumption, common to all the classical sociologists (even, in his
own way, to Max Weber), and going back through them to Montesquieu if not
beyond (Aron, 1989), is that social structure explains culture, or that the latter
reflects the former; in many versions, culture is an adaptation to social structure.
This intuition is alive and well through the social sciences, the humanities, and
among lay people. Many of these accounts have considerable plausibility, though
since they conflict with each other they cannot all be true. However, aside from
casual empiricism, the evidence for them consists largely of correlations between
cultural choices and social positions, demonstrations that the superstructure can
be predicted from the base. Famously, for instance, Bourdieu (1984) attempts
to do this for survey data.
We do not wish to assert that social position is never a cause of cultural
choices; like everyone else, we think that it often is. The issue, rather, is the
evidence for such theories, and in particular for the magnitude of such effects.
3.1 Simulation Model
We work with what is, frankly, a toy model of contagion (though, see footnote
13 below). There are n individuals connected in an undirected social network.
12Preliminary versions of these results appeared in Shalizi (2007), and as long ago as 2005
at http://bactra.org/notebooks/neutral-cultural-networks.html. We understand from a
presentation by Prof. Miller McPherson that he and colleagues have been working on parallel
lines, and will soon publish a demonstration that biases of this sort can be quite substantial
even for the canonical General Social Survey (M. McPherson, “Social Effects in Blau Space”,
presentation at MERSIH 2, 14 November 2009).
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X(i)
A(i,j)Y(i,t-1)
Y(i,t)
X(j)
Y(j,t-1)
Y(j,t)
Figure 7: Graphical model showing the causal structure of the model simulated
in Section 3.1; cf. Figure 6. Notice that here, the persistent traits X have no
direct causal influence on the choices Y . As we show, however, diffusion of
choices along homophilous ties creates states where Y can be predicted from X.
Each individual i has an observed trait Xi which is an unchanging variable; in
our examples, this will be binary. The network is homophilous on this trait,
so that individuals with the same value of X are more likely to be connected.
Individuals also have a time-varying choice variable Yi(t), which again we will
take to be binary. The initial choices, Yi(0), are set by flipping a fair coin (i.e.
an unbiased Bernoulli process), and are therefore independent of the traits Xi.
Choices evolve as follows: at each time t, we pick an individual It, uniformly
at random from i ∈ {1, ..., n}, independently of all prior events. This individual
then picks a neighbor, again uniformly at random, Jt ∈ {j : AItj = 1}, and
either, with very high probability, copies their choice, so that YIt(t) = YJt(t−1),
or, with very low probability, assumes the opposite choice, for YIt(t) = 1−YJt(t−
1); all other individuals retain their previous choices. This process repeats for
each time step. Figure 7 shows the causal structure.
This random copying model is, of course, a drastic oversimplification of
actual processes of transmission and influence, which have been extensively
studied in social psychology and allied fields since the 1920s (Bartlett, 1932;
Sperber, 1996; Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Friedkin, 1998).13 However, not only is
it adequate to demonstrate the existence of the phenomenon we are concerned
with, its very abstraction helps indicate just how robust the problem is.
Probabilistically, the vector Y (t) is a Markov chain, specifically a variant of
the “voter model” of statistical mechanics on a graph (Liggett, 1985; Sood and
Redner, 2005); the minor addition of low-frequency noise (doing the opposite
of the selected neighbor) keeps the homogeneous configurations (where Yi is
constant over i) from being absorbing states, but has little influence on the
13Notice that the expected value of YIt (t+1) is just the mean of Yj(t) for the j neighboring
It. The expected value of Yi(t+ 1) for all i is thus a weighted average of Yi(t) and the mean
of their neighbors. At the level of expectations, then, this process belongs to the family of
linear social influence models used in, e.g., Friedkin (1998). .
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medium-run behavior we are concerned with.
Figure 8 shows a typical evolution of this model. In the top image at the
initial state of the system, there are two clusters based on social traits X, but
the individual cultural choices (colors represent values of Y ) are independent of
these traits. The bottom image shows the same network and configuration after
3000 updates. Now, even by eye, it is clear that one of the choices has become
associated with one of the social types.
This can be confirmed more quantitatively by doing a logistic regression of
choice on trait (Figure 9) at several points during the diffusion process. In this
particular example, there are significant deviations in each direction. First, the
association between trait 1 and color 1 is positive and significant, and remains
so for several dozen iterations; then the diffusion reverses the association, which
then becomes negative and significant. For comparison, a network with the
same average degree but no homophilous tie formation is shown to undergo the
same diffusion process but with no corresponding association between choice
and trait. 14
Intuitively, the copying process tends to make neighbors more similar to each
other; Ian’s choice can be predicted from Joey’s choice. On regular lattices, this
mechanism causes the voter model to self-organize into spatially-homogeneous
domains, with slowly shifting boundaries between them (Cox and Griffeath,
1986). A similar process is at work here, only, owing to the assortative nature
of the graph, neighbors tend to be of the same social type. Hence social type is
an indirect cue to network neighborhood, and accordingly predicts choices.
To summarize, this “neutral” process of diffusion, together with homophily,
is sufficient to create what looks like a causal connection between an individual’s
social traits and cultural choice. This is because individuals’ choices are not
independent conditional on their traits, as is generally assumed in, e.g., survey
research; diffusion creates the observed dependence.15
This demonstration shows that it is difficult to argue that, for example, being
of type 0 is an indirect cause of picking the color black as opposed to red, since
even within a single run of the model the association can be seen to reverse.
Put another way, differences in social types are at most related to differences in
choices, not to the actual content of those choices.
4 Constructive Responses
To sum up the argument so far, we have shown that latent homophily together
with causal effects from the homophilous trait cannot be readily distinguished,
observationally, from contagion or influence, and that this remains true even
if there is asymmetry between “senders” and “receivers” in the network. We
14Note that the standard errors are from the isolated logistic regression at each time point;
when taken collectively, the errors in the effect size would be different. Our point remains
that this would be the effect size estimated if the time evolution were not properly accounted
for.
15It should be clarified here that the problem is not the ecological fallacy, or a red-state/blue-
state issue, (Gelman et al., 2008) since the simulation is not aggregating any data.
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Figure 8: An illustration of the diffusion process on a network with homophilous
ties; members of the left and right clusters have attribute values of 0 and 1
respectively. Initially (top), there is very little detectable similarity between
choices within each cluster; however, after a few hundred time steps (bottom),
there is a clear association between trait and cluster caused entirely by the
diffusion along homophilous ties.
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Figure 9: Coefficient estimates for logistic regressions of choice on trait as func-
tions of time. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals on each run, in-
dependent of all others. Left: the evolution in a homophilous network; in this
run of the simulation, the coefficient first becomes negative and statistically
significant, then becomes positive and significant, purely due to diffusion along
homophilous ties, before returning to a state of negative significance. Right: a
corresponding series of estimates in a network where ties form independently of
traits; deviations from neutrality are much smaller.
have also shown that the combination of homophily and contagion can imitate
a causal effect of the homophilous trait. It requires little extra to see that con-
tagion, plus a causal influence of the contagious trait, yields a network that
contains the appearance of homophily. Thus, given any two of homophily, con-
tagion, and individual-level causation, the third member of the triad seems to
follow.
We realize that these results appear to wreck the hopes on which many ob-
servational studies of social networks have rested. It would be nice to think that
something could, nonetheless be salvaged from the ruins. The “easy” solution is
to use expert knowledge of the system to identify all causally relevant variables,
measure a sufficient set of them, and adjust for them appropriately (Morgan and
Winship, 2007; Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 2001). Since this is clearly a Utopian
proposal, we sketch three constructive responses which may be possible when
dealing with network data where the causal structure is imperfectly understood
or incompletely measured. These are to randomize over the network, to place
bounds on unidentifiable effects, and to use the division of the network into
communities as a proxy for latent homophily.
4.1 Identifying Contagion from Non-Neighbors
The essential obstacle to identifying contagion in the setting of Figure 1 is that
the presence or absence of a social tie Aij between individuals i and j provides
information on the latent variable Xi, whether we implicity include the tie by
predicting Yi(t) from the past values of neighbors Yj(t− 1) or we explicitly add
Aij to the prediction model. In the language of graphical models, conditioning
or selecting on Aij “activates the collider” at that variable. This suggests that
we would do better, in some circumstances, to construct a useful inference by
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deliberately not conditioning on the social network, thereby keeping the collider
quiescent.16 We outline this method to demonstrate the possibility, rather than
to advocate a new prescription for solving the problem.
We can conduct the following procedure over many repeated trials:
1. Divide the nodes into two groups, by assigning each node to one of two
bins with equal probability; let these groups be labelled as J1 and J2.
2. Let YJ1(t) be the vector-valued time series obtained by collecting each of
the Yi(t) for i ∈ J1 into one object, and similarly for YJ2(t).
3. Use some available mechanism to predict the time series for the first bin,
YJ1(t). from its lagged counterpart, YJ2(t − 1), while controlling for the
previous time point within the first half, YJ1(t− 1).
By repeating this procedure, then averaging over all iterations (producing
new partitions each time), there will be a non-zero predictive ability if and only
if there is actual contagion or influence. We can see why one must average
over multiple divisions as follows. Clearly, influence is possible between the two
halves only if there are social ties linking them. However, there will generally
exist some way of picking J1 and J2 so that there are no linking ties, and in
the presence of homophily, those will tend to be divisions of the network into
parts which are unusually dissimilar in their homophilous traits. If we restricted
ourself to values of J1 and J2 which did have linking ties, we would once again
be selecting on the homophilous trait and activating colliders.
This may not be a practical method, as the statistical power of this test may
be very low — the data have very high dimension, and the method deliberately
selects random predictors — but it will be non-zero.
Even the random-halves test will fail, however, if we add a direct causal effect
of Xj on Yi(t) (or one modulated by Aij). We omitted such a link in Figure
1 and subsequently, on the assumption that causal effects between individuals
must pass through observed behavior Y , but this is a non-trivial substantive
hypothesis requiring rigorous justification.
4.2 Bounds
In Sections 2 and 3, we saw that certain causal effects were not identifiable;
that different causal processes could produce identical patterns of observed as-
sociations. As Manski (2007) emphasizes, even when parameters (such as the
causal effect of Yj(t − 1) on Yi(t)) are observationally unidentifiable, the dis-
tribution of observations may suffice to bound the parameters. (With sampled
data, the empirical distribution of observations generally provides estimators of
those bounds.) Sometimes these bounds can be quite useful, even in the general
non-parametric case.
We thus propose as a topic for future research placing bounds on the causal
effect of Yj(t − 1) on Yi(t) in terms of observable associations, assuming the
16Thanks to Peter Spirtes and Richard Scheines for making this paradoxical suggestion.
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structure of Figure 1. If the bound on this effect excluded zero, that would
show the observed association could not be due solely to homophily, but that
some contagion must also be present.
If we keep the causal structure of Figure 5, assuming that the Y and X
variables are all jointly Gaussian and all relations between continuous variables
are linear17 would let us employ the usual rules for linear path diagrams (Spirtes
et al., 2001). The standardized linear-model coefficient for regressing senders
on receivers, i.e., Yi(t) on Yj(t − 1), controlling for all other observables, turns
out to be
ρ[Xj , Yj(t− 1)]ρ[Xi, Xj |Aij = 1]ρ[Xi, Yi(t)]
where ρ[K,L] is the path coefficient between K and L (and ρ[K,L|M ] is the
path coefficient given the required condition M , rather than an observable that
would be controlled for). Clearly, any standardized regression coefficient can be
obtained here by adjusting path coefficients for unobserved variables X. Thus
a bound on the true causal effect cannot be based on the linear regression
coefficient alone, but we hope it may still be possible to find a bound which
uses more information about the pattern of associations.
It would also be valuable — and perhaps more tractable — to place limits on
the magnitude of the association which could be generated solely by homophily.
Parallel remarks apply to bounding the causal effect of Xi on Yi(t) assuming
the structure of Figure 6; we suspect, though merely on intuition, that this will
be harder than bounding contagion effects.
Along these lines, it would be particularly interesting to bound the degree of
asymmetry in regressions which can be generated in the absence of direct causal
influence (as in Section 2.2). Even though asymmetry as such can be produced
in the absence of influence or contagion, it could be that by some standard, really
big asymmetries can only plausibly be explained by influence, so that detecting
such asymmetries would be evidence for influence. More exactly, if one can
establish that in the absence of direct influence the degree of asymmetry can be
at most α0, and one finds an actual asymmetry of α̂ > α0, then the hypothesis
of influence has passed a more or less severe test (Mayo, 1996), the severity
depending on the ease with which sampling fluctuations and the like can push
the estimated asymmetry α̂ over the threshold when the “true” asymmetry (in
the population or ensemble) was below it.
4.3 Network Clustering
Since the problems we have identified stem from latent heterogeneity of a
causally important trait, the solution would seem to be to identify, and then
control for, the latent trait. “Homophily” means simply that individuals tend
to choose neighbors that resemble them; this tendency will be especially pro-
nounced if pairs of neighbors also have other neighbors in common, since these
pairings will also be driven by homophily. This suggests that homophily, latent
17Note that our simulation had a non-linear relationship between Xi and Yi.
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or manifest, will tend to produce a network built primarily of homogeneous clus-
ters, also called, in this context, “communities” or “modules”. Inversely, such
clusters will tend to consist of nodes with the same value of the homophilous
trait.
The topic of community discovery — essentially, dividing graphs into ho-
mogeneous, densely inter-connected clusters of nodes, with minimal connection
between clusters — has been thoroughly explored in the recent literature (ex-
plicitly in Girvan and Newman (2002); Newman and Girvan (2003); Bickel and
Chen (2009); Porter et al. (2009); Fortunato (2010), implicitly in much smaller
clusters in Elwert and Christakis (2008)). A natural idea would be to first estab-
lish the existence of these clusters, to note the memberships of each individual
in the chosen model, call this estimate Cˆi, and to control for Cˆi when looking
for evidence of contagion or influence.
By the arguments we have presented so far, such control-by-clustering will
generally be unable to eliminate the confounding18. However, in conjunction
with the bounds approach mentioned above, conditioning on estimated commu-
nity memberships might still noticeably reduce the confounding. On the other
hand, misspecification of the block structure may make the problem worse —
consider the cases where the generating mechanism may be a mixed-membership
block model (Airoldi et al., 2008) or “role” model (Reichardt and White, 2007)
but communities are “discovered” assuming a simple modular network struc-
ture. Estimating the damage due to misspecification in this case is a goal of
future research.
5 Conclusion: Towards Responsible Just-So Story-
Telling
We have seen that when there is latent homophily, contagion effects are uniden-
tifiable, and even the presence of contagion cannot be distinguished observation-
ally from a causal effect of the homophilous trait. Conversely, when contagion
and homophily both exist, choices can be predicted from the homophilous trait,
and so the effects of such traits on socially influenced variables is again obser-
vationally unidentifiable. These results raise barriers to many inferences social
scientists would like to make. The barriers can be breached by assuming enough
about the causal architecture of the process in question, though then the infer-
ences stand or fall with those architectural assumptions; perhaps the bounding
approach can squeeze an opening through them as well. Beyond these technical
qualifications, what is the larger moral for social science?
Accounts of social contagion are fundamentally causal accounts, pointing to
18The exception will be if Cˆi was a predictively sufficient statistic, which in this case would
mean that the realized graph A provided enough information to render the true community
memberships of all nodes conditionally independent of their observed behaviors. Then we
would effectively move from the situation of Figure 1 to that of Figure 3b, with Cˆi in the role
of Zi. Determining the class of network models for which such “screening off” holds is the
subject of on-going work.
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one of a number of mechanisms — imitation, persuasion, etc. — by which a
belief or behavior spreads through a population. Similarity among individuals
is explained by their belonging to common networks; differences by differences
in their networks. This parallels the other great project of social science, which
is to explain differences in cultural choices by location within the social struc-
ture, or, at a broader scale, by differences between social structures (Boudon,
1986/1989; Berger, 1995; Lieberson, 2000). The accounts that have connected
social structure to behavior have typically been adaptationist or functionalist:
the content or meaning of cultural choices serves the choosers’ interests, or their
classes’ interests, or (far more nebulously) the interests of the system, or re-
flects their experiences in life, or rationalizes their positions in life, and so forth.
At the very least, these are causal accounts: if social structure or social po-
sitions were different, the content of the choices would be different. Far more
commonly, they really are adaptationist accounts: choices fit to the objective
circumstances. They accordingly follow the familiar pattern of the “Just-So”
story (Kipling, 1974), with all their familiar problems. It would be intellectually
irresponsible to accept such accounts, with their strong causal claims, without
careful checking; but also irresponsible to simply dismiss them out of hand.
The example of biology suggests that a powerful way of doing such tests is to
use “neutral models” (Harvey and Pagel, 1991; Gillespie, 1998), which biologists
use to test claims that features of organisms are evolutionary adaptations; we
note the similarity with the “null hypothesis” in general statistical hypothesis
testing. A neutral evolutionary model should include all the relevant features of
the evolutionary process except adaptive forces (such as natural or sexual selec-
tion). The expected behavior of the system is then calculated under the neutral
model (namely, the distribution of expected outcomes); if the data depart sig-
nificantly from the predictions of the neutral model, this is taken as evidence
of adaptation. Said another way, the neutral model as a whole is used as the
null hypothesis, not just a generic regression model with some coefficients set to
zero. For instance, a model might include mutation and genetic recombination,
but assume all organisms are equal likely to be parents of the next generation;
all have equal fitness. Gene frequencies will change in such a model because of
random fluctuations; some organisms become parents and have differing num-
bers of offspring. Indeed, we expect some genetic variants to go to fixation (to
become universal) in the population, and others to disappear entirely through
the effects of repeated sampling.19 We are not aware of any studies in the so-
ciology of culture or related fields employing formal neutral models; however,
something similar to this is implicit in the arguments of Lieberson (2000),20
and some other strands of recent work on “endogenous explanations of culture”
(Kaufman, 2004).
The point is not that accounts of causation and adaptation in social phe-
19Superficially, this looks very much like the effects of selection, even though the statistical
properties of fixation via sampling and fixation via selection are quite different; in particular,
fixation via selection is much faster.
20Lieberson and Lynn (2002), while offering evolutionary biology as a methodological model
for social science, curiously does not mention the issue of neutral models.
21
nomena must be rejected; it is that they must be subjected to critical scrutiny,
and that comparison to neutral models is a particularly useful form of critique.
Our toy models produce the kind of phenomena which theories of contagion, or
of adaptation and reflection, set out to explain. (It is only too easy to imag-
ine crafting a historical narrative for Figure 8, explaining the deep forces that
impelled the east to become red.) The best way forward for advocates of those
theories may in fact be to craft better, more compelling neutral models than
ours, and show that even these cannot account for the data. Thus they will
support their theories not only by plausible just-so stories, but by compelling
evidence.
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